Re-Engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic and Cultural Imperatives of Nation-Building in Singapore by TAN, Eugene K. B.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
9-2003
Re-Engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic and
Cultural Imperatives of Nation-Building in
Singapore
Eugene K. B. TAN
Singapore Management University, eugenet@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741003000432
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Race Commons, and
the Race and Ethnicity Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
TAN, Eugene K. B.. Re-Engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic and Cultural Imperatives of Nation-Building in Singapore. (2003).
China Quarterly. 175, 751-774. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/865
Re-engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic
and Cultural Imperatives of Nation-building
in Singapore*
Eugene K. B. Tan
ABSTRACT This article examines the management of Chinese identity and culture
since Singapore attained independence in 1965. Due to the delicate regional environ-
ment, ethnic Chinese identity has been closely managed by the ruling elites, which
have been dominated by the English-educated Chinese. There is the evolution from
a deliberate policy of maintaining a low-key ethnic Chinese profile to the recent effort
to re-sinicize – in form – the majority ethnic group. The article examines the policy
impulses and implications for such a landmark change in reconceptualizing the
Chinese-Singapore identity, which can be attributed to the needs of regime mainte-
nance buttressed by Confucian ethos as well as the security and economic demands
of nation-building.
The geo-political realities facing Singapore, an economically successful
city-state with a population comprising 77 per cent ethnic Chinese, have
dictated that it exercises great caution in positioning itself vis-a`-vis its
predominantly Malay-Muslim neighbours. The management of ethnic
Chinese identity and culture as well as the relationship with communist
China are delicate exercises in balancing the needs of nation-building,
economic growth and regime maintenance. Although Singapore is a
multi-racial and multi-religious society in its orientation, the functional
and organizational role of race remains pertinent.1
In this article, “Chineseness” refers to the Singaporean perspective of
the political elites placing increasing importance and prominence – in
form, if not in substance – on Chinese language and culture within the
political and socio-cultural discourse. Chineseness embodies an ethnic
Chinese racial-cultural identity and value system that is being moulded as
transnational, especially economic, processes bring Chinese-Singaporeans
into contact with mainland Chinese and the Chinese diaspora. It is
identified by the close relationship, on both economic and other fronts,
between Singapore and China, facilitated by the belief that co-ethnics’
transnational transactions are exclusively advantaged and that China is
the cultural motherland of the Chinese-Singaporeans. The overall mani-
festation is one of the ethnic Chinese-Singaporean nation-space gradually
increasing within the political-ideological terrain which is, in turn, cross-
* Portions of this article were presented at the international conference on “Ethnic Chinese
in Singapore and Malaysia: A Dialogue between Tradition and Modernity,” 30 June 2001,
Singapore. I am aware of the inherent limitation of the article’s sources of information which
are predominantly in the English language but have endeavoured to reflect the nuances not
captured by the English-language materials.
1. On the centrality of race in Singapore, see David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics
in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 66–111; John Clammer, Race and State in
Independent Singapore 1965–1990 (Hants: Ashgate, 1998); Raj K. Vasil, Asianising
Singapore: The PAP’s Management of Ethnicity (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1995).
 The China Quarterly, 2003
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mapped on to the patent need for Singapore to retain economic and
cultural relevancy vis-a`-vis China.2
This process of re-engaging Chineseness throws into sharp relief the
persistence of subtle differences within the heterogeneous ethnic Chinese
community in Singapore. The government treads a thin line between the
Chinese-educated Chinese/Chinese-speakers on the one hand and the
English-educated/English-speaking Chinese and the minority races on the
other. The former often accuse the government of not doing enough to
reduce the slide in Chinese language proficiency and complain about the
lack of observance of Chinese culture among the younger generation of
Chinese. In contrast, the latter are concerned about the perceived higher
profile given to things Chinese.
Despite the apparent differences, the unifying theme of Singaporean-
Chineseness centres on the powerful instrumentality that coheres from the
calibrated use of Chinese race, language and culture in political gover-
nance, economic development and cultural imperatives. The deliberate
function of “situational ethnicity” in Singapore necessarily results in the
meanings of Chineseness being constantly renegotiated and rearticulated
by the state and its elites, in synchrony with the ebbs and flows of their
significance to state-led discourse in the various spheres of politics,
economics and culture.
This article examines the policy impulses and implications for the
changes in reconceptualizing the Chinese-Singaporean identity. From an
emphasis on de-Chineseness for much of the 1960s and 1970s, the 1990s
have witnessed an emergent Chineseness together with the assertive
belief that Chineseness is a cornerstone of Singapore’s success. The
article argues that the emphasis on Chineseness is predicated on develop-
ment and regime objectives, including the demands of regime mainte-
nance, buttressed by a neo-Confucian ethos, as well as the security and
economic demands of state- and nation-building and is intimately linked
with the rise of China.
Waxing and Waning of Chineseness3
The 2000 population census reiterated that the ethnic Chinese popu-
lation, while still economically dominant, is under-reproducing. It also
highlighted the increasing popularity of English and Christianity, es-
pecially among the younger and better-educated Chinese. The ethnic
Chinese comprise 76.8 per cent of the total resident population in
2. The concept of Chineseness is not without scholarly controversy. Recent discussion
includes Wang Gungwu, “Chineseness: the dilemmas of place and practice,” in Gary G.
Hamilton (ed.), Cosmopolitan Capitalists: Hong Kong and the Chinese Diaspora at the end
of the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), pp. 118–134; Ien
Ang, On Not Speaking Chinese: Living between Asia and the West (London: Routledge,
2001).
3. For a succinct socio-historical overview of the Chinese community, see Kwok Kian
Woon, “Singapore,” in Lynn Pan (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas (Singapore:
Archipelago Press and Landmark Books, 1998), pp. 200–217. On the mixed race
Babas/Peranakans/Straits-born Chinese (officially classified as ethnic Chinese), see Jurgen
Rudolph, Reconstructing Identities: A Social History of the Babas in Singapore (Hants:
Ashgate, 1998).
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Singapore with a median age of 35 years (against 30 years in 1990),
which is the highest among the races. Over the last two decades, the
average number of ethnic Chinese children born has declined from above
to below replacement level – from 3.4 in 1980 to 2.8 in 1990 and 2.5 in
2000. The average Chinese household size fell from 4.8 persons to 4.2 to
3.6 in the corresponding period. To maintain the Chinese share at a
critical minimum threshold of three-quarters of the total population,
immigration of ethnic Chinese professionals from Greater China is tacitly
encouraged.
Most ethnic Chinese are Buddhists (53.6 per cent; up from 39.4 per
cent in 1990), followed by “no religion” (18.6 per cent), Christians (16.5
per cent), Daoists and “Chinese traditional beliefs” (10.8 per cent) and
other religions (0.5 per cent). Daoism and Chinese traditional beliefs, the
most popular religion among the Chinese in 1980 (38.2 per cent), have
declined significantly in the wake of a Buddhist resurgence among the
ethnic Chinese. A pertinent trend is the “prevalence of Christianity”
among the younger and better-educated (often English-speaking) Chi-
nese.4 As a result of the relatively successful Speak Mandarin Campaign
and the no-dialect policy, Mandarin is the most popular language spoken
in Chinese homes with 45.1 per cent (up from 30.1 per cent in 1990) and
the popularity of Chinese dialects has declined significantly from 50.3 per
cent in 1990 to 30.7 per cent by 2000. English language popularity among
the Chinese increased from 19.3 per cent to 23.9 per cent. Younger
Chinese families, although literate in both Chinese and English, are more
likely to be English-speaking than older ones. In 1988, 20 per cent of the
Primary 1 cohort came from English-speaking homes; by 1998, the figure
had doubled to 40 per cent.5 Despite Singapore’s Chinese-majority
complexion, the Chinese-Singaporean sense of national pride, although
high, did not rank as high as the Indians and Malays. Similarly, they
recorded the lowest index scores for citizen-nation psychological ties.6
Singapore’s management of Chineseness can be divided into three
phases.7 The first, from 1965 to 1979, was characterized by an emphasis
on “de-Chineseness” with the impetus being the strategic need to avoid
being seen as a “third China” and the pressing determination to build a
new multi-racial society from the ashes of the failed “Malaysian
Malaysia” project.8 The government consciously sought to develop a
4. “Singapore census of population, 2000: advance data release no. 2 – religion”
(Singapore: Department of Statistics, November 2000), p. 3. Figures in this section are taken
from the 2000 census.
5. “Ministerial statement on Chinese language in schools,” Singapore Parliamentary
Debates, Official Record, 20 January 1999, cols. 1809–54. See also the ensuing debate at cols.
1855–1903.
6. Institute of Policy Studies press release, “Citizens and the nation – IPS survey of
national pride and psychological ties to the nation,” 18 February 2000.
7. This mirrors, in some respect, Singapore’s policy on the management of its ethnic
diversity: see Vasil, Asianising Singapore.
8. Malayan multiracialism was probably first developed in the 1920s by Tan Cheng Lock,
a Straits-born Chinese community leader and founder of the Malaysian Chinese Association:
see Clive Christie, Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia 1900–1980: Political Ideas of
the Anti-Colonial Era (Surrey: Curzon, 2001), pp. 118–122.
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“Singaporean Singapore” identity, while recognizing the special position
of the indigenous Malays. The second phase (1979–90) marked the
beginnings of a tentative higher profile for Chineseness in Singapore. The
third phase (1990–present) sees a more confident assertion of Chinese-
ness in everyday life.
Since independence, English is taught as the first language for purposes
of international commerce, industry and science in Singapore national
schools. The economic rationale alone justified the importance placed on
English. More significantly, this gradually reduced the relative value of
Chinese education in the eyes of Chinese parents and employers in the
1960s and 1970s. Though latent, the Chinese-educated fears of political
and cultural marginalization ensured that the lobbying for a higher profile
for Chinese culture, language and education were dealt with sensitively as
they constituted “a sacred heritage dear to the hearts of all Chinese,
especially the poorly educated merchant millionaires and shopkeepers of
Singapore.”9 Then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew made conscious efforts
to ensure that the communists and the chauvinists could not denounce
him as a “deculturalized Chinaman” who “preferred English to Chinese
as the more important medium of instruction in the schools.”10
Yet the government had its way with Nanyang University (fondly
known as “Nantah”) in curbing Chinese student radicalism. Widely
regarded as the jewel of Chinese education in South-East Asia and a
bastion of resistance to the government in the field of Chinese education,
Nantah adopted English as the language of instruction in 1975, and, in
1980, merged with the University of Singapore to form the present
National University of Singapore. The non-existence of Nantah today
rankles a segment of the Chinese population. Founded as a symbol of
Chinese culture, Nantah received widespread support from the local and
regional Chinese community. Today, there are still calls to revive Nan-
tah.11
Notwithstanding its strong economic and cultural ties with China,
Singapore carefully nurtures its independent image and plays down its
Chinese majority polity within the regional geo-political setting. As “the
centre of Overseas Chinese achievement in South-East Asia,”12 Singa-
pore, in deference to its neighbours’ feelings, delayed the establishment
of formal diplomatic ties with China until after Sino-Indonesian relations
were normalized in 1990. As Leifer observed:
9. Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Singapore
Press Holdings & Times Editions, 1998), p. 170. The simmering issue of Chinese education
was handled deftly by the ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) Chinese vanguards; see Sai
Siew Min and Huang Jianli, “The ‘Chinese-educated’ political vanguards: Ong Pang Boon,
Lee Khoon Choy and Jek Yeun Thong,” in Lam Peng Er and Kevin Y.L. Tan (eds.), Lee’s
Lieutenants: Singapore’s Old Guard (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin 1999), pp. 132–168.
10. Lee, The Singapore Story, pp. 221–22.
11. Nanyang Technology University (NTU), Nantah’s de facto successor institution, is
likely to be renamed Nanyang University although the historical link with Nantah for
renaming has been explicitly rejected. See “NTU to become Nanyang U within decade,”
Singapore Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 10 (October 2001), p. 10.
12. Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, 3rd ed. (London:
Routledge, 2001), p. 208.
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741003000432
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Singapore Management University (SMU), on 16 Nov 2017 at 08:18:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
755Nation-building in Singapore
Within its regional environment, a corresponding admiration is mixed with envy and
resentment in important part because of the prevailing ethnic-Chinese cultural identity
of the island-state and the persistence of the regional middleman role of local Chinese
entrenched during the colonial era. That identity has been reinforced from the late
1970s by the government’s policy of encouraging the study and use of Mandarin by
the vast majority of the population, albeit in conjunction with that of English. That
attempt at reinforcing cultural identity has made managing relations with closest
neighbours a matter of continuing difficulty and those with the People’s Republic of
China a matter of acute sensitivity.13
The halcyon days of decolonization in South-East Asia and the com-
munist–nationalist rivalry in mainland China engaged Malaya(sia) and
Singapore intensely.14 Compounded by the ideological danger posed by
China’s active support of communism in South-East Asia, the blistering
fight against pro-communist elements in the 1950s and 1960s left deep
ideological scars and reinforced security concerns of the inevitable
linkage between the local Chinese population and communism.15 The
hold of communist ideology on the Chinese-educated Chinese was per-
vasive in the late 1940s up to the late 1960s, leading Lee Kuan Yew to
remark that:
… it was difficult to identify good Chinese-educated candidates who would remain
loyal when the communists opened fired on us [PAP] … we were fishing on the same
pond as the communists, who exploited both Chinese nationalism and Marxist-Maoist
ideas of egalitarianism … Their mental terms of reference were Chinese history,
Chinese parables and proverbs, the legendary success of the Chinese communist
revolution as against their own frustrating life in Singapore.16
But the notion of a communist united front then and the supposed
affinity of Chinese ethnicity for communism have been attributed to
British “heightened official paranoia.”17 At the same time, a cultural gulf
between the Chinese-educated and English-educated Chinese was a facet
of Singapore politics in the lead-up to and aftermath of independence.
The Chinese-educated alienation from mainstream political life in col-
onial Singapore was evident.18 This cultural gulf and theme of alienation
in various spheres of Singapore life persist today, albeit in new forms. In
later years, Lee added:
13. Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London:
Routledge, 2000), p. 18.
14. On the Japanese occupation and the colonial impact on revolutionary mobilization in
Malaya, see Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements,
1945–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 67–133.
15. Communism and Chinese nationalism were already of concern to the Special Branch,
the colonial internal security apparatus, from as early as the 1920s. See Ban Kah Choon,
Absent History: The Untold Story of Special Branch Operations in Singapore 1915–1942
(Singapore: Raffles, 2001).
16. Lee, The Singapore Story, p. 280.
17. T. N. Harper, “Lim Chin Siong and the ‘Singapore Story’,” in Tan Jing Quee and Jomo
K. S. (eds.), Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History (Kuala Lumpur: INSAN, 2001),
pp. 13–15.
18. On Chinese politics in colonial Singapore, see Yong Ching Fatt, Chinese Leadership
and Power in Colonial Singapore (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992).
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741003000432
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Singapore Management University (SMU), on 16 Nov 2017 at 08:18:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
756 The China Quarterly
A people steeped in Chinese values had more discipline, were more courteous, and
respectful to elders. The result was a more orderly society. When these values were
diluted by an English education, the result was less vigour and discipline and more
casual behaviour. Worse, the English-educated generally lacked self-confidence
because they were not speaking their own native language. The dramatic confronta-
tions between the communist-led Chinese middle school students and my own
government brought home these substantial differences in culture and ideals, repre-
sented in two different value systems.19
The official historiography on the merger with Malaya and the struggle
for ascendancy after Singapore’s independence portrays “a Herculean
struggle between non-communists and communists” with Chinese edu-
cation being heavily politicized and “woven into the master narrative as
another ‘sinister’ communist attempt to feed on the dissatisfaction of the
Chinese-educated so as to create agitation and tension for political
mileage.” A key element was “making one notion of ‘Chinese-ness,’
supposedly the communist one, criminal.”20 For Lee Kuan Yew, “the
biggest single theme that galvanized the Chinese-speaking was Chinese
culture, and the need to preserve Chinese traditions through the Chinese
schools. It was not a proletarian issue; it was plain, simple chauvinism.”21
Labour issues became intertwined with race and ideology as the ethnic
Chinese community was closely associated with the nationalist and
communist influence in the development of labour relations in pre-inde-
pendent Singapore.22 This juxtaposition of ethnic and ideological identi-
ties, of which Chinese identity, culture and education were key
dimensions, was firmly imprinted in the national psyche and this histori-
cal baggage formed the background to the differences between the
Chinese-educated and English-educated Chinese in the subsequent years.
The bruising experience of the PAP’s pioneer leaders with the pro-
communist elements resulted in the deliberate development of new
parapolitical and parastatal organizations such as the People’s Associ-
ation, Citizens’ Consultative Committees and Community Centre Man-
agement Committees as alternative structures and institutions for political
mobilization. They succeeded in marginalizing the hitherto dominant
ethnic Chinese social mobilizers in the clan associations and powerful
19. Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965–2000, Memoirs
of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings & Times Editions, 2000), pp. 546–47.
20. Sai and Huang, “The ‘Chinese-educated’ political vanguards,” p. 144–46. A parallel
narrative depicts the PAP English-educated, multiracial non-communists triumphing over the
Chinese-educated communists and chauvinists.
21. Lee, The Singapore Story, pp. 185–86. Cf. Harper, “Lim Chin Siong and the ‘Singapore
Story’,” p. 15: “However, recent writing has challenged the stereotypical notion – perpetuated
in many accounts since – that the politics of the ‘Chinese-educated’ was driven by an innate
ethnocentrism and a natural susceptibility to a ‘secret society complex’ and to Communism….
Student politics was fuelled by a wider sense of exclusion for the Chinese-educated with a
colonial society in which fluency in English was the route to employment and advancement.
It was underpinned by resentment of the privileges of the Anglophone Chinese. Yet within
the Chinese community, graduates of Chinese middle schools were themselves something of
an elite.”
22. Carl A. Trocki, “Development of labour organisation in Singapore, 1800–1960,”
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 47, No. 1 (2001), pp. 115–129.
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Chinese businessmen, which had considerable resources and support to
exert influence on local politics, especially on issues of culture and
language.23
The government opted to alienate the powerful and influential Chinese
business community through its co-option of multinational corporations
and government-linked companies in the economic modernization pro-
gramme.24 This reduced the government’s dependence on the Chinese
business community and concomitantly reduced the latter’s political
influence. In recent years, however, the increasing need for a more
broad-based economic development – including nurturing hitherto ne-
glected small and medium enterprises as internal dynamos – has resulted
in ethnic Chinese capital being increasingly re-integrated into the econ-
omic mainstream.25 It is likely that they will develop into an important
political constituency.26
The Speak Mandarin campaign was launched in 1979 and marked the
beginning of the tentative higher profile for Chineseness in Singapore
(phase two), in tandem with the government’s “Asianization” policy.
Emphasis was placed on the return to one’s cultural roots and heritage,
amidst the embedded and heightened concern that the ethnic Chinese
were becoming deculturalized. The tentative opening of China under
Deng Xiaoping heralded significant economic advantages for Singapore
and became an undercurrent in the Speak Mandarin campaign. To benefit
from business opportunities in China, the Chinese-Singaporeans had to be
able to communicate effectively in Chinese and have an intimate under-
standing of the Chinese psyche. The Special Assistance Plan schools
were also introduced in 1979 to preserve the best of the old Chinese
schools and to encourage good academic performance in a rich Chinese
environment. During this period, an ersatz Confucianism in Singapore’s
political governance was initiated. The high-water mark was attained
when Confucian studies was made an approved subject under the compul-
sory religious knowledge programme in the mid-1980s.27
The concern with the loss of one’s cultural heritage, especially among
23. Chan Kwok Bun and Ng Beoy Kui, “Singapore,” in Edmund Terence Gomez and
Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (eds.), Chinese Business in Southeast Asia: Contesting Cultural
Explanations, Researching Entrepreneurship (Surrey: Curzon, 2001), p. 41; Yong, Chinese
Leadership and Power in Colonial Singapore, pp. 273–284.
24. W. G. Huff, The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 320, 355–57. On the
early Chinese entrepreneurs contribution to the Singapore economy, see pp. 208–235.
25. Ian Chalmers, “Loosening state control in Singapore: the emergence of local capital
as a political force,” Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1992), pp.
57–84.
26. The broadening of collaboration between the government and SCCCI is enunciated in
the Minister of Trade and Industry’s speech at the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (SCCCI) 95th Anniversary Celebrations and the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial
Hall Fund-Raising Dinner, 24 October 2001.
27. Ostensibly one would not regard Confucianism as a religion. See Eddie C. Y. Kuo,
“Confucianism as political discourse in Singapore: the case of an incomplete revitalization
movement,” in Tu Wei-ming (ed.), Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral
Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 294–309.
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741003000432
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Singapore Management University (SMU), on 16 Nov 2017 at 08:18:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
758 The China Quarterly
the younger generation Chinese, ensured that the Asianization of Singa-
pore continued under phase three (since 1990). The “East Asian miracle”
phenomenon promulgated by the World Bank provided boisterous incen-
tive for Singapore to be the self-declared “Asian values” spokesman.
Economic success and increased security encouraged a more confident
and extensive assertion of Chineseness in Singapore.28 Although Confu-
cianization apparently took a back seat, the essence of Asian values
postulated a particularistic style of political governance premised on
state-defined community interests having precedence over the individual.
However, divisions within the ethnic Chinese community persisted with
ideational and economic differentials becoming more evident with econ-
omic advancement.
Refreshing the Ethnic Chinese Intra-ethnic Divisions
With a common education system in which English was the medium of
instruction in all schools by the late 1970s, the Chinese-educated/English-
educated distinction of the 1950s to 1970s evolved into a “Chinese-speak-
ing/English-speaking Chinese” characterization in the 1980s and 1990s.
This is now recast in the “heartlander–cosmopolitan” distinction. It
continues to reflect differential adaptability and receptivity to globaliza-
tion and the English language but emphasizes intrinsic value and assumed
loyalty. This highlights the salient undercurrents despite almost four
decades of nation-building and social engineering. In discussing whether
Singapore would endure, Prime Minister Goh drew attention to the
heartlander–cosmopolitan divide in Singapore society at the 1999 Na-
tional Day Rally. For ease of reference, the Prime Minister’s typology of
the cosmopolitan and heartlander differences is set out in Table 1.
Given Singapore’s racial and socio-economic make-up, the cosmopoli-
tan is akin to the English-educated/English-speaking Chinese while the
heartlander is the Chinese-educated /Chinese-speaking Chinese. The cos-
mopolitan–heartlander divide is not merely about language preferences
and material differences; it is more starkly conceived in terms of value
system and intrinsic loyalties. The heartlanders are characterized as
providing the critical cultural and moral ballast needed by a disciplined
society for its continued survival and prosperity. The cosmopolitans are
economic dynamos enjoying “flexible citizenship,” whose loyalties are
fluid and motivated by transient connections of mobile employment and
commercial opportunities.29 Ultimately, the heartlander–cosmopolitan
distinction refreshes the characterization of the Chinese-educated/En-
glish-educated in a new, albeit more worrying, form. Although the
substance of the differences is undiluted in any significant way, the
28. Confucianism and Chinese ethnicity, combined with increased regional economic
integration, have produced some diasporic re-Sinification: Michael Pinches, “Cultural
relations, class and the new rich of Asia,” in Michael Pinches (ed.), Culture and Privilege
in Capitalist Asia (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1–55.
29. Ong Aihwa, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2000).
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Table 1: The Heartlander–Cosmopolitan Distinction
Heartlanders Cosmopolitans
Attributes
“… make their living within “… their outlook is
the country. Their orientation international. They speak
and interests are local rather English but are bilingual.
than international. Their skills They have skills that
are not marketable beyond command good incomes
Singapore. They speak Singlish. – banking, IT, engineering,
They include taxi-drivers, science and technology.
stallholders, provision shop They produce goods and
owners, production workers and services for the global
contractors … If they emigrate market. Many cosmopolitans
to America, they will probably use Singapore as a base to
settle in a Chinatown, open a operate in the region. They
Chinese restaurant and call it can work and be comfortable
an ‘eating house’.” anywhere in the world.”
Utility to
Singapore
(“Both “Heartlanders play a major role “Cosmopolitans, on the
heartlanders and in maintaining our core values other hand, are indispensable
cosmopolitans and our social stability. They in generating wealth for
are important are the core of our society. Singapore. They extend our
to Singapore’s Without them, there will be no economic reach. The world
well being.”) safe and stable Singapore, no is their market. Without
Singapore system, no them, Singapore cannot run
Singapore brand name.” as an efficient, high
performance society.”
Challenge for
Singapore “… to get the heartlanders “… to get the cosmopolitans
(“If to understand what the to feel an obligation and
cosmopolitans cosmopolitans contribute sense of duty to the
and heartlanders to Singapore’s and their heartlanders.”
cease to identify own well being …”
with each other,
our society will
fall apart.”)
Source:
Prime Minister’s 1999 National Day Rally speech.
distinction is divisive and reifies the ideational–economic divide within
the Chinese-Singaporean community in stark terms that shows no sign of
being bridged.30
30. However, the heartlander–cosmopolitan distinction is seldom referred to publicly.
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The Putative Creation of Chinese Cultural Elites31
The quiet emphasis and ascendancy of Chineseness requires a core of
Chinese cultural elites to provide the intellectual and cultural capital. By
1997, although Mandarin was gaining popularity at the expense of
Chinese dialects, the government expressed concern over the lack of a
sufficient of pool of cultural elites who have “deep knowledge of Chinese
language, culture, history, literature and traditions.”32 Language is re-
garded as the key that unlocks the wisdom, legacy and virtues of a 5,000-
year-old civilization. The mother tongue policy, a critical component of
the bilingual education framework, is deemed critical in maintaining
social discipline and facilitating economic relevancy. Deputy Prime
Minister Lee Hsien Loong put it succinctly:
The Government’s long-standing policy on bilingualism and learning of mother
tongues in schools remains unchanged. English is and will remain our common
working language … But the mother tongue gives us a crucial part of our values,
roots and identity. It gives us direct access to our cultural heritage, and a world-view
that complements the perspective of the English-speaking world. It provides us the
ballast to face adversity and challenges with fortitude, and a sense of quiet confidence
about our place in the world. Maintaining our distinctiveness and identity as an Asian
society will help us to endure as a nation. This applies to all ethnic groups.
In 1999, the government announced changes to the teaching of Chinese
language in schools. The revised Chinese language curriculum has the
twin aims of “reproducing a core group of Singaporeans who are steeped
in the Chinese cultural heritage, history, literature and the arts; we need
them to be Chinese language teachers, writers, journalists, community
leaders, MPs and Ministers; and secondly, setting realistic standards in
CL [Chinese language] for all pupils, including those from English
speaking homes.” On the production of a Chinese cultural elite, Lee
Hsien Loong elaborated that:
The Chinese cultural elite are an important source of strength for our multi-racial,
multi-religious society. Their group instincts, political and social values, and social
cohesion complement the different spirit and outlook of English educated Singapore-
ans. Chinese High School and Raffles Institution are both outstanding schools, but the
pupils they produce are sharply of different moulds. Singapore society would be
poorer, and weaker, if it had only one of the two.
The government instinctively and quickly moderated the expectations of
the Chinese-educated and speakers. Lee cautioned:
But we cannot aim to preserve our Chinese elite exactly in the form of the 1950s or
1960s. That was a product of the particular phase of our history: post-war colonial
Singapore, in an anti-colonial struggle for independence. The Chinese elite played a
major role, both on the Communist and non-Communist sides. Their support was
again important later, in an anti-communal struggle after Singapore entered Malaysia.
That period has passed. Even in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, the values and
31. Unless otherwise stated, quotations in this section are from Deputy Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong’s Ministerial Statement on Chinese Language in Schools in Parliament, 20
January 1999.
32. Prime Minister Goh’s National Day Rally speech in Mandarin, 24 August 1997.
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culture have not remained static. They have evolved differently, in response to
different political and social pressures. So the Chinese elite in Singapore must
develop, and help Chinese culture to play its rightful role in shaping our cosmopolitan
society and knowledge economy of the 21st century.
Supporters welcomed efforts to promote the Chinese language and
knowledge of Chinese culture. This state of affairs assuaged to some
extent, albeit unsatisfactorily, the concern of the Chinese-educated over
the health of Chinese language, culture and heritage. However, for some,
the changes are superficial and do not go far enough in arresting the
decline in standards. Although Mandarin is the most popular language
among the Chinese, the standards leave much to be desired. Indeed,
Chinese-Singaporeans are said to speak “something like Chinese,” sug-
gesting mediocre standards.33 Furthermore, the long-term prognosis is not
so optimistic with English being the language of choice among the
younger generation of culturally ambivalent Chinese. With the impending
retirement of the last cohorts of Nantah-educated Chinese language
teachers over the next few years, these issues of cultural markers remain
a continual source of concern ensuring their political saliency.34 Not
surprisingly, the emphasis on bilingualism and the mother tongue in
schools has its detractors. The English-speaking Chinese are concerned
that such a focus on the mother tongue (Chinese), as an important
criterion for doing well in the education system, unduly punishes students
who are weak in Chinese. In an attempt to arrive at a middle ground and
to assure the English-educated Chinese, the government also introduced
the less rigorous Chinese language B syllabus.35 Anecdotal evidence
suggest that the bilingualism and mother tongue policies have been
among the reasons cited for the emigration of young Chinese families.
Government campaigns have been the main vehicle to promote Chi-
neseness from a linguistic and cultural approach. Although the Speak
Mandarin campaign has succeeded in phasing out Chinese dialects, the
ethnic Chinese are not reading or writing sufficiently in Chinese. This
means a declining readership of Chinese newspapers among the younger
generation.36 Thus, the campaign’s objective has been refined in recent
years to promoting “Mandarin as the social language of the Chinese. The
educated elite should use more Mandarin socially.”37 The focus is on
expanding the use of Mandarin to include the workplace and to get
33. See further “Will Chinese become a dumpling house language?” The Straits Times
(ST), 31 March 2001, p. H16; “Arresting the Chinese language decline,” ST, 5 May 2002, p.
22.
34. Goh Yeng Seng, “A sociolinguistic profile of Chinese language teachers in Singapore,”
in Jason Tan, S. Gopinathan and Ho Wan Kam (eds.), Challenges Facing The Singapore
Education System Today (Singapore: Prentice Hall, 2001), pp. 227–245. The import of
Chinese language teachers from Malaysia and China has been tried as a stopgap measure.
35. The offer was subsequently opened for the other races to have their own cultural elites.
See Warren Fernandez, “S’pore still walks language tightrope” and Chua Lee Hoong, “These
days, one language can highlight three divides,” ST, 23 January 1999, p. 59.
36. See Prime Minister Goh’s speech at the Lianhe zaobao 75th Anniversary Gala Dinner,
6 September 1998; “Fewer here reading and writing Chinese,” ST, 7 March 2001, p. H5.
37. Prime Minister Goh’s 1997 National Day Rally speech in Mandarin, 27 August 1997.
On the evolution of the Speak Mandarin campaign, see Promote Mandarin Council,
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Chinese Singaporeans to speak better Mandarin with the English-speak-
ing Chinese as the target group. Complementing the Speak Mandarin
campaign is the biennial Chinese Cultural Festival, which serves to
highlight the “self-renewal and splendid spirit of Chinese culture … and
to promote the understanding of Chinese culture.”38
Nevertheless, the perennial concern over the decline of Chinese lan-
guage, culture and identity among young Chinese-Singaporeans continues
to be the clarion call for the Chinese-educated and Chinese-speakers. The
recent debate surrounding the preferential adoption of Western names by
Chinese-Singaporeans is an indicator of the recurrent saliency of Chinese
identity issues.39 Other concerns that are repeatedly flagged include the
need for a full-fledged Chinese Language Department at NTU; the
Nantah alumni’s grievance that their contributions have not been ade-
quately recognized; the welfare of Chinese language teachers in schools;
and the revitalizing of Chinese grassroots organizations such as clan
associations.
The Electoral Politics of Chineseness
Singapore’s Asianization policy belies the criticality of cultivating the
Chinese-educated/Chinese-speaking constituency as a valuable vote-bank
and a bastion of political and moral conservatism. Lending impetus is the
political elites’ revisionist view that Chineseness – with its pragmatic and
consensus-seeking culture – is necessary for the maintenance of contin-
ued political stability in Singapore’s “limited democracy.” The PAP
government has always felt the acute need to be sensitive to the Chinese-
educated given their numbers, especially when they continue to see
themselves as being marginalized.40 Although the number of Chinese-
educated and lower income ethnic Chinese is declining, the need to woo
them remains part of the electoral landscape. There is the constant fear of
being outflanked or for others to be seen to be more Chinese than the
PAP.
By the 1990s, the younger generation of Chinese-speakers replaced the
older Chinese-educated as the core constituency. The 1997 general
elections drew attention to the uneasy relationship between the Chinese-
educated/Chinese-speaking and English-educated/English-speaking Chi-
nese.41 In 1992, the government-affiliated ethnic Chinese self-help group,
footnote continued
Mandarin: The Chinese Connection (Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 2000).
The campaign’s website is at http://mandarin.org.sg/.
38. Speech by Environment Minister Lim Swee Say at the 2002 festival opening, 1 March
2002.
39. See, for instance, “Chinese, but they prefer English names,” ST, 20 June 2001, p. H2.
40. Raj K. Vasil, Governing Singapore: Democracy and National Development (St
Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2000), pp. 185–89; Kwok, “Singapore,” p. 215.
41. Cherian George, Singapore: The Air-conditioned Nation, Essays of the Politics of
Comfort and Control 1990–2000 (Singapore: Landmark Books, 2000), pp. 108–113; Kwok,
“Singapore,” p. 215; Vasil, Governing Singapore, pp. 196–97.
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the Chinese Development and Assistance Council was established in
response to the silent majority Chinese electoral backlash in the 1991
general elections, particularly among the less well-off, against the
government’s policies which were deemed to be disadvantageous to the
dominant ethnic group.42
Beyond refining policies that emphasize Chinese language and culture,
the PAP places the onus on itself to field a sufficient number of
candidates who are deemed acceptable to the Chinese-educated or who
have the necessary Chinese dialect proficiency. Chinese dialects demon-
strate a resilience and popular resonance among older Chinese Singapore-
ans such that during the general elections even government ministers
would campaign using Chinese dialects, especially in the heartlands. The
government formed the Chinese community liaison group, which com-
prises mainly Chinese-educated MPs, to help it be “attuned to sentiments
in the politically important Chinese-speaking community … [and] to
make sure this community does not feel marginalized in increasingly
English-speaking Singapore.”43 In seeking to capture the ethnic Chinese
vote, the challenge is to maintain an even keel since electoral expediency
can undermine the multiracial policy by unwittingly encouraging ethnic
outflanking. In the midst of creeping Chineseness, this can have negative
knock-on effects on the canvassing by the other racial groups for their
own cultural and political space.
Attributes of Creeping Chineseness in Singapore’s Political Discourse
Beyond the national campaigns to promote Chinese language and
culture, a subtler dimension of the expanding realm of Chineseness is in
the sphere of political governance. Although appearing tangential to the
issues of Chinese culture and identity, the Confucian ethos is dominant in
Singapore’s political governance. This provides a fertile terrain for
Singapore’s junzi-centred and community-first governance.
The landmark Goh Keng Swee education report and the Ong Teng
Cheong moral education report set the stage for the promotion of
Mandarin (and other mother tongues) and laid the groundwork for the
propagation of “Asian values” in Singapore’s political governance dis-
course.44 The Asian values discourse gives a civilizational-cum-philo-
sophical dimension and justification to Singapore’s particularistic style of
governance as being unique and superior to liberal democracy.45 Trans-
42. Ibid. pp. 179–190, 213–16; Ho Khai Leong, The Politics of Policy-Making in
Singapore (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 123–28.
43. “MPs begin new round of visits to Chinese groups,” ST, 16 February 2001, p. H8. A
common theme is for the government to make a special effort to retain Chinese culture and
traditions.
44. Education Study Team, Report on the Ministry of Education 1978 (Singapore:
Singapore National Printers, 1979); and Moral Education Committee, Report on Moral
Education 1979 (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1979).
45. At the 1999 Davos World Economic Forum, Lee Kuan Yew stated that he had all along
referred to “Confucianist values” rather than “Asian values”: see “ ‘Asian values’? I didn’t
use this term, says SM,” ST, 30 January 1999, p. 6; “Looking to the future,” Asiaweek, 21
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lated into practice, it sanctions a less universalistic stance in areas where
adherence to international norms is less critical in the functioning of a
modern economy. Particularistic socio-cultural values and principles of
political governance are jealously guarded on the principle of cultural
specificity and relativism. An emphasis on duties, rather than rights, and
the priority of society’s interests over the individual is commonly charac-
terized as “communitarianism.”46 The element of the community, begin-
ning with the family as the smallest unit and the state as the largest, is
now enshrined in Singapore’s Shared Values.47 More importantly, Singa-
pore-styled communitarianism blurs the distinctions between state, com-
munity and individual interests.
The political leadership espouses the Confucian precept that leaders
have a moral duty to act in the collective interest; it is from this that they
derive their moral authority to govern. As the government is presumed to
be virtuous, it should not be subjected to the pervasive scrutiny that
political leaders in liberal democracies are subjected to. To do so is to
undermine the integrity of the political system imperiling the common
good. The government’s imprimatur of the Confucian notion of good
government by good men is a cornerstone of Singapore’s political
governance philosophy.48 The Shared Values White Paper affirmed its
particularistic neo-Confucian core:
The concept of government by honourable men (junzi) who have a duty to do right
for the people, and who have the trust and respect of the population, fits us better than
the Western idea that a government should be given as limited powers as possible,
and should always be treated with suspicion unless proven otherwise.49
Rigorous efforts were made, prior its the adoption in January 1993, to
footnote continued
May 1999, p. 34. Michael Hill, “ ‘Asian values’ as reverse Orientalism: Singapore,” Asia
Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2000), pp. 177–190 at 187 notes: “This value-transform-
ation [to individualism] was regarded with concern by the government because it was seen
to influence national competitiveness, prosperity, and even survival as a nation.”
46. Chua Beng-Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London:
Routledge, 1995); Chua Beng-Huat, “ ‘Asian values’ discourse and the resurrection of the
social,” positions: east asia cultural critique, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1999), pp. 573–592; Daniel A.
Bell, East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000); and Lucian Pye, “Civility, social capital, and civil society: three
powerful concepts for explaining Asia,” in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Patterns of Social Capital:
Stability and Change in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), pp. 375–394.
47. Promoted as safeguards against undesirable values permeating from developed
countries, the Shared Values are: nation before community and society above self; family as
the basic unit of society; community support and respect for the individual; consensus, not
conflict, and racial and religious harmony. On the centrality of the family in Confucian
thought, see Jeffrey F. Meyer, “Concord and conflict from a Confucian perspective: the
paradigm of the family,” in Joseph B. Gittler (ed.), Ideas of Concord and Discord in Selected
World Religions (Stamford, CN: JAI Press, 2000), pp. 59–79.
48. Singapore’s ministers and senior civil servants are also among the best paid public
officials in the world.
49. Cmd. 1 of 1991, p. 8, para. 41. For the classical understanding of the Confucian junzi,
see Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Trouble with Confucianism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1991), pp. 24–45.
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highlight the Shared Values’ commonality with the cultural traditions and
value systems of the minorities. However, Confucianism, even if
modified to suit local needs, is still regarded as being of Chinese origin.
Hence, given Singapore’s multi-ethnic make-up, it is questionable
whether such neo-Confucianist values would find resonance with the
non-Chinese community. Ironically, Singapore-style communitarianism
might result in a fragmented society. A neo-Confucianist approach might
cohere with the majority Chinese but would certainly smack of ethnic
domination for the minority races. Further, in emphasizing a civilizational
discourse in the maintenance of a desired value system amid economic
imperatives of globalization and liberalization, resort has been made to
the separate ethnic, cultural and religious values and identities. If an
overarching identity cannot be forged, centrifugal forces would be set in
motion undermining nation-building efforts. It is this conflation of the
needs of state-building with nation-building that has pushed aspects of
Chineseness to the forefront of political discourse, creating unease among
the minorities.
The Sun Yat-sen Connection in Singapore’s Historiography?
The modern nation-state tends to project its history back to a geo-
graphic and cultural entity with a long and distinguished past so as to
derive some dimension of heritage, legitimacy and standing born of the
longue duree.50 This often requires the invention of traditions, myths and
national heroes. Singapore’s restless search for an inspiring national past
has led to Chinese nationalism and civilizational discourse being tenu-
ously intertwined with Singapore’s historiography. This reflects the at-
tempt to re-engage the Chinese core of Singapore society in the light of
the rise of China. It portends a re-writing of Singapore’s nationalist
narrative as part of a longer and revolutionary movement in terms of
time, ideas and race.
In this revised historiography, Singapore’s nationalism is identified as
having its inspirations from Dr Sun Yat-sen’s 1911 Chinese revolution.
The Chinese migrants in Singapore then are portrayed as having shaped
and contributed to the genesis of diasporic and local nationalisms. The
revival of interest in Sun – vividly manifested in the prominence ac-
corded to the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall – is also a recent
celebration of the cultural idea of being Chinese and Sun’s catalytic
transformation of the Chinese mind everywhere.51 Sun’s former villa
50. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, revised edition (London: Verso, 1991).
51. Sun had used the villa as his temporary headquarters in South-East Asia between 1900
and 1911. Lee Kuan Yew opened the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall on 12 November
2001 to mark Sun’s birthday and the 90th anniversary of the Chinese revolution. See “Sun
Yat Sen villa to recount his life,” ST, 29 August 2001, p. H8; “Sun-kissed shrine,” ST, 12
November 2001, p. L4. See also Huang Jianli, “Dissonant narratives of the past: positioning
the Sun Yat Sen villa in Singapore,” unpublished conference paper, June 2001, on the villa’s
shifting status in Singapore’s history. More information on the villa can be found at its website,
http://wanqingyuan.com.sg.
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became a Singapore national monument in 1994 and is included as a
national institution within the compulsory National Education pro-
gramme.52 Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo recently said that:
The 1911 revolution contributed to Singapore’s anti-colonial movement and, later,
independence. And the Chinese nationalism awakened by Dr Sun provided a lot of
energy for Singapore’s nationalism. The [Sun Yat-sen] villa is a testament to the
historical contributions our forefathers made to that important revolution, not only
with money but also with their blood and their lives. Singapore Chinese should take
great pride in this.53
On another occasion, Yeo said that:
For a long time, we refused to gazette it [Sun Yat-sen villa] as a national monument
because we thought it had nothing to do with independent Singapore. Now we
approach it differently. Singaporeans played a significant role in the Chinese
Revolution of 1911 which was not only a political revolution but also a cultural
revolution which changed the way Chinese all over the world saw themselves.54
However, this re-written narrative of the origins of Singapore’s
nationalism is a historical rupture and a quantum leap of historical logic,
whose resonance is uncertain and likely to be contested by the racial
minorities. At the turn of the 20th century the Chinese immigrants in
Singapore were sojourners and did not regard themselves as
“Singaporeans.”55 Further, neither the Singapore nation-state, nor any
notion of it, was existent then. The elevation of Sun, his ideas and
supposed heritage for Singapore’s nation-building process can be catego-
rized as “non-consensual memory” that is hard-pressed for recognition
even within the ethnic Chinese community, much less the other races.
Sun’s elevated status stands in stark contrast to two prominent Second
World War figures – Major-General Lim Bo Seng and Lieutenant Adnan
Saidi. Both fought against Singapore’s aggressors during the war and can
claim closer affinity to Singapore nationalism than Sun’s inchoate
diasporic nationalism. Yet they are deemed unsuitable for elevation as
national heroes as they were “defending Singapore for the British, not
independent Singapore.”56
52. “Students throng Sun Yat Sen Memorial,” ST, 15 May 2002, p. H10. The National
Education (NE) programme aims to “develop national cohesion, the instinct for survival and
confidence in the future”; see the NE website at http://wwwl.moe.edu.sg/ne/.
53. Quoted in “Historical villa’s very slow face-lift,” The Sunday Times, 26 March 2000,
p. 36 and “Sun shone at this old villa,” The Sunday Times, 2 April 2000, pp. 52–53.
54. From the SGH Lecture entitled, “Between north and south, between east and west,”
29 April 2001.
55. Adam McKeown notes the nature of Chinese identity at the turn of the 20th century:
“To be Chinese, anywhere in the world, was to be a representative of the motherland, to have
a stake in the future of China, and to recognize the claims of China and Chinese culture over
one’s loyalty”: see his Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago and
Hawaii, 1900–1936 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 94. See also Prasenjit
Duara, “Nationalists among transnationals: overseas Chinese and the idea of China,
1900–1911,” in Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini (eds.), Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural
Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 39–60.
56. Prime Minister’s Forum, Nanyang Technological University, 11 May 1999. On the
reinsertion of Second World War memory into Singapore’s national narrative of survival and
national identity, see Diana Wong, “Memory suppression and memory production: the
Japanese occupation of Singapore,” in T. Fujitani et al. (eds.), Perilous Memories: The
Asia-Pacific War(s) (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 218–238. There is also
a growing Chinese language literature on Force 136, Lim’s covert unit.
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Sun’s tenuous links with Singapore makes it doubtful that the selective
adoption of aspects of Chinese national history as part of Singapore’s
national past could be truly accepted and internalized by its multiracial
polity. Singapore’s independence had and continues to have broad-based
multiracial support. To segment the origins of this collective memory and
elevate the role of a sojourner, whose appeal to the Chinese then living
here was as Chinese and not as Singaporeans, is to deviate from a
national discourse that patently needs to be more multiracial and cross-
cutting in its appeal and resonance. Instead, it may unwittingly over-em-
phasize the role of the ethnic Chinese over the other races in Singapore’s
path to nationhood.57 The potential to marginalize the non-Chinese racial
groups is significant if indigenous Singaporean nationalism is ignored or
not given due credit alongside Sun’s.
Reassertion of Chineseness – Multifaceted Dimensions
The reassertion of Chineseness is, in part, motivated by the multi-
faceted interactions with China. The economic sphere has been aggres-
sively cultivated as a platform for the reassertion of Chineseness in
Singapore, outside the realm of education. It has been argued that
Singapore’s strength lies in its straddling East and West as well as its
cultural affinity with China. In contemporary Singaporean political dis-
course, China is simultaneously portrayed as an opportunity of challenges
and a natural worry to Singapore’s and South-East Asia’s well-being.
Singapore is alive to the need to manage the “Chinese juggernaut” which
has shifted economic gravity away from South-East Asia, resulting in
significantly lower foreign direct investments in the region since 1997.58
Singapore’s economic approach vis-a`-vis China is to “jump on to the
Chinese bandwagon” by co-opting the opportunities and ameliorating the
threats.59 This necessitates that Singapore remains relevant to China’s
economic agenda by rigorously tapping on cultural affinity and ties as
well as good political relations.
Thus, Singapore actively positions itself as a “brand state,” utilizing its
economic and cultural positioning, for transnational influence and knowl-
edge arbitrage with China and the Chinese overseas communities.60 This
leverage on the strategic equity of a brand niche is an instance of
57. As Gillis reminds us: “Identities and memories are not things we think about, but things
we think with”: John R. Gillis (ed.), Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 5 (original emphasis).
58. Kenichi Ohmae, “Profits and perils in China, Inc.,” StrategyBusiness (online
edition), Issue 26 (2002). Moreover, closer cross-straits economic relations culminating in the
China–Taiwan economies integrating fully could have adverse effects on Singapore’s
economy: see, “Convergence of cross-straits economic interests and implications for
Singapore” (Singapore: Ministry of Trade and Industry, August 2001).
59. The theme of China’s economic rise is a constant refrain in the numerous ministerial
speeches since early 2001 in a conscious attempt to prime Singapore society.
60. Peter van Ham, “The rise of the brand state: the postmodern politics of image and
reputation,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5 (2001), pp. 2–6. A “brand state” is one with
“geographical and political settings that seem trivial compared to their emotional resonance
among an increasingly global audience of consumers … The brand state’s use of its history,
geography, and ethnic motifs to construct its own distinct image is a benign campaign that
lacks deep-rooted and often antagonistic sense of national identity and uniqueness that can
accompany nationalism.”
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Singapore riding with, rather than going against, the Chinese juggernaut.
In an age of mobile capital and the expected ascendancy of China,
Singapore has sought to transform its role from mere trader and middle-
man to international arbitrageur with an inside track to business opportu-
nities in China. Singapore has strategically positioned itself as a
knowledge arbitrage hub in China’s economic matters; a gateway for
foreign investors intending to break into the China market. This com-
mand of cross-cultural accommodation has been capitalized to emphasize
Singapore’s utility as a valuable joint venture partner for foreign multina-
tionals seeking to do business in China.61 Singapore’s re-branding itself
vis-a`-vis China is now embodied in its official declaration that China is
part of its economic hinterland.62
Sino-Singapore economic relations are expanding rapidly. Singapore is
eyeing China’s World Trade Organization membership and its hosting of
the 2008 Olympic Games as opportunities for bilateral economic ties to
develop further. Between 1990 and 2000, bilateral trade between Singa-
pore and China increased robustly at 15 per cent per annum, tripling from
23 billion renminbi (S$5.2 billion) in 1990 to 96 billion renminbi (S$21.6
billion) in 2000. In 2000, Sino-Singapore trade expanded by 32 per cent.
Forty per cent of Singapore’s bilateral trade is accounted for by Guang-
dong province alone.63 China is Singapore’s top foreign investment
destination (since 1997) and its fifth largest trading partner. Singapore’s
cumulative investment in China amounts to US$37.7 billion with US$830
million invested in the first quarter of 2002.64 Likewise, Singapore seeks
to be a gateway to South-East Asia for increasing Chinese economic
activity in the region and is China’s second favourite destination for its
investments in South-East Asia.65 The abiding belief in the advantage that
61. Knowledge arbitrage – the knowledge and ability to take advantage of market
differences in labour costs and product markets – facilitates companies in sourcing for the
best production sites based on the determinants of manufacturing cost, access to markets and
distribution channels: see John Kao, “The world wide web of Chinese business,” Harvard
Business Review, Vol. 71, No. 2 (1993), pp. 24–36.
62. Michael Porter’s influential cluster theory, as a driver of prosperity in the international
political economy, highlights the need to integrate a city-region with other economic units:
see, for example, his “Locations, clusters, and company strategy,” in Gordon L. Clark et al.
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), pp. 253–274; and “Regions and the new economics of competition,” in Allen J. Scott
(ed.), Global City-Regions: Trends, Theory, Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001),
pp. 139–157.
63. Statistics complied from “Singapore and China economic relations” (Singapore:
Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2001) and International Enterprise Singapore (formerly, the
Trade Development Board) press statement, “Singapore to vie for a stake in the Beijing
Olympics 2008,” 9 January 2002. For an analysis of the Chinese provinces’ foreign economic
relations, especially with Chinese overseas communities, see Peter T. Y. Cheung and James
T. H. Tang, “The external relations of China’s provinces,” in David M. Lampton (ed.), The
Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000 (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 91–122. On China’s strategies of courting Chinese
overseas, see Mette Thunø, “Reaching out and incorporating Chinese overseas: the
trans-territorial scope of the PRC by the end of the 20th century,” The China Quarterly, No.
168 (2001), pp. 910–929.
64. “S’poreans pump more into China,” ST, 30 May 2002, p. 1.
65. “S’pore draws more Chinese investments,” ST, 1 March 2002, p. S12. On China’s
investments in South-East Asia, see “Buying into Southeast Asia,” Far Eastern Economic
Review, 28 March 2002, pp. 30–33. South-East Asia accounted for only 6.1% of China’s FDI
in 1999.
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co-ethnics have in cross-border transactions has also seen Singapore
seeking to partake in the booming Sino-Indian trade.66
Not content with the coastal regions, Singapore seeks to tap the first
offerings of China’s strategic “look west” policy with the initial focus
being on business opportunities in the relatively uncharted inner
provinces of Xinjiang and Shaanxi.67 Other initiatives to develop Singa-
pore’s niche in the Chinese economy include having government scholars
spend a year in China to work with their counterparts and acquire
intimate knowledge of China;68 the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s
(MTI) newly launched Asia Business Fellowship Programme, which aims
to develop a core of future business leaders who have deep knowledge
and strong links to the region, especially China and India;69 the creation
of an international business division within MTI with a focus on China;
and the resource and network information platforms such as “Network
China.”70 The network of Singapore’s International Enterprise offices in
China is likely to be expanded to cover Sichuan, Shaanxi, Yunnan and
Shandong provinces, and the Chongqing municipality. A new Singapore
Chamber of Commerce and Industry in China was established in August
2002.
These multi-faceted efforts, emphasizing both the hardware of business
information and intelligence and the software of cultural affinity, seek to
emplace Singapore as a key player in the China market. In 1991, the
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCCI) ini-
tiated the inaugural World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention (WCEC) in
Singapore.71 The Singapore-based convention secretariat manages the
on-line World Chinese Business Network.72 The government has also
encouraged the clan associations to reconceptualize their role in the
cultural and economic life of the 21st century in order to attract younger
members and to reap potential economic benefits from kinship ties.73
Beyond the economic sphere, Singapore has initiated several endeav-
ours on research and public education on the Chinese overseas, seeking
to carve “a role in the development of Chinese culture and its evolving
civilization.”74 These include: the establishment of the Chinese Heritage
66. “S’pore as partner in the Sino-Indian trade story,” Business Times (Singapore), 15 April
2002.
67. “BG Yeo in Xinjiang next week,” ST, 18 August 2001, p. 4.
68. “Govt to find ways to enter China market,” ST, 26 July 2001, p. 3.
69. The Singapore government will sponsor up to 100 students annually for MBA and
business-related postgraduate studies in the best universities in China, India and other Asian
countries. After graduation, these Asia Business Fellows will be required to serve
Singapore-based enterprises in their internationalisation drive.
70. Network China’s website can be accessed via http://www.ventureabroad.org.sg.
71. The WCEC has held six biennial meetings since 1991; the most recent in September
2001 in Nanjing. Singapore’s delegation to the Nanjing WCEC was the largest business
mission in SCCCI’s history: “200 from S’pore to attend Chinese entrepreneurs meet,” ST, 14
September 2001, p. A2.
72. At http://wcbn.zaobao.com/.
73. Liu Hong, “Old linkages, new networks: the globalization of overseas Chinese
voluntary associations and its implications,” The China Quarterly, No. 155 (1998), pp.
582–609.
74. Speech by George Yeo, Minister for Trade and Industry, at the launch of Huayinet,
11 February 2000.
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Centre in 1995, under the auspices of the Singapore Federation of
Chinese Clan Associations, which “can help Singapore develop into an
important centre of Sinic studies in the Pacific Rim”; and the establish-
ment of the National Chinese Internet Programme to develop Singapore
into a cyber-hub for the Chinese language internet. The National Library
Board is working jointly with local and foreign organizations and experts
in the development of Huayinet, a virtual resource centre on overseas
ethnic Chinese communities.75 Such initiatives seek to promote the
Chinese Singaporean cultural broadband facility.
Over the past decade, increasing economic, political and military
contacts have complemented cultural affinity. Sino-Singapore ties have
grown from strength to strength and high-level exchanges are regular and
frequent.76 The closeness of bilateral ties is reflected in the increasing
government-to-government and people-to-people contacts, which are
seemingly more significant than Singapore’s exchanges with its immedi-
ate neighbours.77 As an indicator of deepening bilateral relations, Singa-
pore and China have also agreed to set up a high-level joint council to
examine concrete areas for increased co-operation.78 In the early to
mid-1990s, Singapore’s development experience and model of soft au-
thoritarianism were contemplated as a point of reference and possible
blueprint for China.79 China has studied Singapore’s political and social
control of info-communications technology.80 After Deng Xiaoping’s
southern tour in 1992, a constant stream of delegations from various parts
of China have visited to study Singapore development’s experience of
promoting rapid economic development while maintaining social disci-
pline. The Chinese Mayors’ Study Visit programme, inaugurated in 1997,
has been extended to 2007.81 Of late, however, there appears to be some
75. Huayinet is at http://www.huayinet.org.
76. The intricacies of Sino-Singapore political relations are beyond the scope of this article.
Excellent discussion can be found in Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, especially pp.
108–112, and Khong Yuen Foong, “Singapore: a time for economic and political
engagement,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China: The
Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 109–128.
77. Tourist arrivals from China continue to grow by double digits. In view of its receding
ideological threat and to promote tourist arrivals from China, visa applications have been
simplified and expedited: “Chinese tourists to Singapore will get their visas faster,” ST, 28
September 2001, p. A5; “Follow the flags to save tourism,” Far Eastern Economic Review,
7 March 2002, pp. 22–25. See also “Direct contacts with China vital, says President,” ST, 15
September 2001, p. A3. Likewise, China-bound tours from Singapore are also gaining
popularity.
78. “China, S’pore to set up high-level council,” ST, 27 April 2002, p. 1. The establishment
of this mechanism was agreed upon during then Vice-President Hu Jintao’s visit to Singapore
en route to the US in April 2002.
79. Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle Over
Human Rights in China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 153–57; Paul J. Bolt,
China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in Contemporary Asia
(Westport, CN: Praeger, 2000), pp. 143–49. See also Long Hua, “China favours Singapore
as political model,” ST, 6 July 2001, p. 21 (first published in Hong Kong Economic Journal).
80. Daniel C. Lynch, After The Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work”
in Reformed China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 211.
81. About 200 of China’s mayors and vice-mayors have participated in the programme to
study Singapore’s development experience: “Mayors’ study visits here to continue,” ST, 27
April 2002, p. H3.
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degree of introspection and re-evaluation of the suitability of Singapore’s
model among some China’s liberal intellectuals and lower government
officials.82 In the military sphere, Singapore’s defence ties with China are
“progressing on a step-by-step basis” and defence attaches have been
exchanged.83 China has reportedly offered Singapore military training
facilities on Hainan island.84 Given the multi-faceted dimension of
China–Singapore relations and the subtext of Sinophobia in South-East
Asia, this cosy state of affairs can be potentially troubling if China seeks
to assert dominance in the region.85
Yet, there appears to be limitations to the efficacy of cultural affinity
between co-ethnics. Industrial parks overseas have been touted as in-
stances of Singapore exporting its development model of rapid economic
development with social order.86 However, Singapore’s investments in
the Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) project and the Wuxi-Singapore Indus-
trial Park have also shown the limitations of the co-ethnics’ supposed
cultural familiarity, guanxi and ease of communication. In both instances,
Singapore has since divested its majority stake and transferred the
majority shareholding and management to Chinese parties. For the SIP
project, the transfer took place in 2001, after only seven years and despite
82. “China rethinks the Singapore model,” Lianhe zaobao (online), 1 December 2001.
Indeed, not all of Lee’s political views are acceptable to the Chinese leadership. Six chapters
of the second volume of Lee’s memoirs for release in China, ranging from Deng’s China to
the Tianamen Incident and the Malayan Communist Party, were deleted, leaving the memoirs
“devoid of practically all of Mr Lee’s account of his encounters with China and Chinese
leaders”: “SM’s memoirs on sale with cuts,” ST, 8 September 2001, p. 6; “Chinese censors
cut parts of Lee Kuan Yew memoirs,” International Herald Tribune, 7 August 2001, p. 4.
83. Robert Karniol, Interview with Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Defence of Singapore, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 35, No. 26 (27 June 2001),
p. 32. On a state visit to China, Singapore President S R Nathan said that, “Our defence people
have exchanges with you … To what extent it can develop depends on the complementarity
between our defence philosophy and yours [China’s]”: “Natural to worry over China:
President Nathan,” ST, 13 September 2001, p. A3. Singapore subscribes to the triangular
balance of power equilibrium between China, Japan and the United States in maintaining
peace and stability in East Asia.
84. “Taiwan, China and S’pore,” Today (Singapore), 23 April 2002, p. 3; “Wu sneaks into
Singapore,” Taipei Times (online edition), 12 January 2001. Two Chinese navy warships
made their first-ever port call to Singapore in May 2002. This should herald more visits by
the Chinese navy: “China warships’ first visit to S’pore,” ST, 18 May 2002, p. A2. On
Sino-Singapore military ties, see Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces
of Singapore (St Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2000), pp. 33–37.
85. “China will insist on a political role commensurate with its growing economic power”:
Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st
Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 114. On the myths, which can be
accentuated to threats, surrounding relations between China, South-East Asia and the Chinese
overseas, see Wang Gungwu, China and Southeast Asia: Myths, Threats and Culture
(Singapore: World Scientific & Singapore University Press, 1999); Wang Gungwu, The
Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2000); David S. G. Goodman, “Are Asia’s ‘ethnic Chinese’ a
regional-security threat?” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (1997–98), pp. 140–155; and Zha Daojiong,
“China and the May 1998 riots of Indonesia: exploring the issues,” The Pacific Review, Vol.
13, No. 4 (2000), pp. 557–575.
86. Janerik Gidlund, “Illiberal and successful? In search of sustainable regional growth in
authoritarian states,” in David E. Andersson and Jessie P.H. Poon (eds.), Asia Pacific
Transitions (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 239–254; Lee Lai To, “The lion and the dragon:
a view on Singapore–China Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 28
(2001), pp. 415–425.
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interventions at the highest political levels. The difficulties have been
attributed to different mindsets in “the way we think, our way of life, our
working habits and styles.”87 Domestic political sensitivity and the need
to preserve bilateral Sino-Singapore ties have dictated the portrayal of the
SIP project as a laudable example of the close co-operation between
China and Singapore.88
Indeed, a government report concedes that Chinese-Singaporean busi-
nesses do not fare as well as their Hong Kong and Taiwanese counter-
parts.89 The younger Chinese-Singaporeans appear to be condescending
towards the potential “hollowing out” of Singapore’s economy by a
resurgent China.90 The mainland Chinese population living, working and
studying in Singapore has also seen noticeable increases.91 However, the
local Chinese ambivalence and antipathy towards these new co-ethnic
migrants tellingly demonstrates that the government’s imperatives to-
wards China and Chineseness has a variegated response from Chinese-
Singaporeans.
Conclusion
Although not reaching the state of re-sinification, the domestic political
and cultural indicators point to a trend of creeping Chineseness within
Singapore society. Closer and more wide-ranging Sino-Singapore politi-
cal and economic relations have bolstered this development. Over the last
three-and-a-half decades, one can discern the confident assertion and
promotion of Chinese identity, in tandem with the growing international
political and economic stature of China. The Chinese community’s “new
sense of powerfulness” and its “decisive influence in government policy”
have rendered Chinese-speaking leaders “no longer feel[ing] a sense of
marginalization and powerlessness.”92 There is also the unspoken Chi-
87. “Singaporeans face different Chinese mindset,” ST, 11 December 2000, p. A3.
88. See Singapore Software Project Office, In Unison: Bilateral Collaboration on the
Suzhou Industrial Park (Singapore: Times Editions, 2001). “Suzhou’s success a boon to
bilateral relations,” ST, 29 May 2002, p. 6.
89. “Performance and success factors of Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan investors in
China” (Singapore: Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2001). On the influence of government
policies on Singapore’s national culture and its impact on business behaviour, see Ji Li and
Leonard Karakowsky, “Cultural malleability in an East Asian context: an illustration of the
relationship between government policy, national culture and firm behaviour,” Administra-
tion & Society, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2002), pp. 176–201.
90. Prime Minister Goh expressed his concern over this blase´ attitude towards China in
his 2001 National Day Rally. See also “A wake-up call from China,” The Sunday Times, 22
July 2001, p. P4 and the letters in response, which drew the Prime Minister’s attention.
91. In March 2001, the Hua Yuan Association was formed and helps the new arrivals from
China to settle in: see “Chinese immigrants form new association,” ST, 2 May 2001, p. H1;
“A home away from home for Chinese nationals,” ST, 13 January 2002, p. 27. The
association’s website is at www.myhuayuan.org. The Singapore government does not release
figures on the number of Chinese nationals in Singapore. Their numbers are evident in
Singapore’s educational institutions.
92. Vasil, Governing Singapore, p. 213. Michael D. Barr’s Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs
Behind the Man (Surrey: Curzon, 2000), at pp. 137–184, documents Lee’s growing awareness
of his Chinese heritage in tandem with the reassertion of Chineseness in Singapore. See also
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nese-Singaporean desire to secure more recognition as the dominant
majority and its invaluable contribution to Singapore’s prosperity.93
Chineseness was initially seen as an obstacle to Singapore’s survival
and nationalism; it is now seen as an asset in Singapore’s overall
development. Beyond the goal of nation-building, one cannot ignore the
subtle influence of the ideology of pragmatism in the management of
Chineseness in Singapore. The hues of Confucian-inspired political gov-
ernance, economic imperatives linked with China’s burgeoning market,
the influence and potential threat China poses, and the ever-present need
to ensure electoral support have led to policies and directives that edge
towards a reconceptualization of Chinese identity, inclining towards a
creeping reassertion of Chinese language and culture. This conflation of
nation-building with state-building has led to aspects of Chineseness
enjoying a disproportionate public presence over the last 20 years. Such
a move has, of course, caused unspoken unease among Singapore’s
minority races and immediate geopolitical locale.94 If unchecked, it would
gradually weaken the multiracial ethos as it touches a raw nerve among
the minorities who have the latent fear of being overwhelmed and being
“left out of an increasingly Chinese Singapore.”95 Prime Minister Goh’s
reminder is timely:
… the outlook of the Chinese community in Singapore has been attuned to its
geo-political environment. The Singaporean Chinese recognise and accept that
Chinese culture and Mandarin must be advanced within the multiracial context of
Singapore and the political and social milieu of Southeast Asia. They know that the
destiny of Singapore is in Southeast Asia. They preserve their heritage but subsume
its display under the broader complexion of Singapore nationalism. They leave
Singaporeans of all races in no doubt that their political standpoint is solidly based
on the national interest of an independent Singapore in Southeast Asia.96
Singapore’s policy of multiracialism is likened to “four overlapping
circles” in which the different communities maintain their cultural ident-
ity and heritage. The overlapping area must continue to enlarge. Ulti-
mately, the Chinese-Singaporean community, as the dominant majority,
needs to be sensitive to the feelings of the racial minorities at a time when
the ethnic Chinese in the region are more confident in asserting their
cultural heritage and identity. In the midst of creeping Chineseness in
footnote continued
Loy Teck Juan et al. (eds.), Lee Kuan Yew on the Chinese Community in Singapore
(Singapore: SCCI and Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations, 1991).
93. Vasil, Governing Singapore, pp. 211–13, 248.
94. Cf. William K. M. Lee, “Ethnicity and ageing in Singapore,” Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 2,
No. 2 (2001), pp. 163–176, who argues that the political leaders attribute Singapore’s success
to Chinese cultural influence which “promotes a notion that the Chinese are a different species
and culturally superior to other ethnic groups.” See also Lily Zubaidah Rahim’s controversial
The Singapore Dilemma: The Political and Educational Marginality of the Malay Community
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998) for the elites’ supposed belief in the ideology
of Malay cultural deficit.
95 George, Singapore: The Air-conditioned Nation, p. 162. This is not to suggest that
discrimination on racial grounds has increased in the last two decades.
96. Speech at the launch of The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas, 26 October 1998.
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Singapore’s society, the challenge is to ensure that the Chinese Singa-
porean is not blind to the multiracial composition of Singapore.97 Neither
should Chinese identity be coterminous with Singapore’s national ident-
ity. For if it comes to pass, such racial hegemony will surely tear
Singapore’s delicate social fabric.
97. See David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000), pp.
89–106, for an incisive discussion of the weaving of the civic and ethnocultural nationalisms
in Singapore in the context of the state’s imperative of ideological and economic management.
At p. 103, Brown notes “the anxiety, fear and insecurity which permeate modern Singapore
society.”
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